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Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0%:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels. Cartel overcharges are positively skewed, pushing the mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 43.4%. Convicted cartels are on average as equally effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels, but bid-rigging conduct does display somewhat lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels. These findings suggest that optimal deterrence requires that monetary penalties ought to be increased.

This study analyzes the trade‐off between strategic flexibility and commitment for cases of simultaneous and related strategic investments under high levels of uncertainty. It develops a model that, using a Cournot game and real option theory, demonstrates that (1) a correlated strategic investment adds value to a portfolio of ongoing strategic investments in a decreasing marginal fashion, and (2) the new investment delays the development of the other investments. Managers who fail to recognize these properties may make strategic commitments that destroy value, even in the presence of options with individual positive values. An important feature of the model is that competitive advantages may flow from market power or from the capability of managing the portfolio.

The duties of the Public Analyst necessarily bring him more or less into contact with the members of his local authority. His work, like that of the other chief officers, is dealt with by one or more Committees before the results as a whole are submitted to the Council. The actual part played by the Committee or Committees depends on the will of the Council, and is in no way laid down by law. One thing is quite clear, namely, that the jurisdiction of the Committee and of the Council only extends the proceedings prior, and subsequent to the analysis of the samples. The nature of the analyses, the scientific methods employed, and the opinions based on the analytical results are entirely in the hands of the Public Analyst himself. The authority may not agree with him, and may not follow his advice, but unless there is very strong reason for doubting his competence, it is their duty to avail themselves of his expert knowledge and experience, and he is obliged to place his services at their disposal in these directions however inadequately he may be paid.

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Future legislation relating to the control of the national milk supply formed the subject of discussion in the House of Commons on the 5th March. Although no new points were brought out, the need for fresh legislation was emphasised in this discussion, especially the need for a general Act that would, while giving the central authority increased powers, do away “with the piecemeal, voluntary, and local enactments at present in existence. It is evident that if any radical change in the present system is to be effective it must not only be general as regards this country, but it must also be imperial” and international; inasmuch as it must deal both with the supplies that are produced at home and with those imported from abroad. It would obviously be in the highest degree unfair to the English farmer to make his stock, workpeople, and premises liable to the frequent expert inspection demanded, and, at the same time, to allow milk to enter this country from abroad without the application of an equally rigorous inspection on this side, and without some form of guarantee from the government of the country of origin. In all matters connected with food supply improved methods of preserving and sterilising as well as increased facilities for international commerce have resulted, as time has gone on, in a large number of food preparations of all kinds being thrown upon the markets. The trade in cheese and butter substitutes as well as that in canned and otherwise preserved meats, and the supply of cereal preparations, afford well known instances, and the milk trade is not singular in the circumstance that a considerable and increasing amount of, milk is treated in various ways, both at home and abroad, for consumption in this country.